Scale bias & state building: an historical perspective on government intervention, political systems & economic performance in tropical Africa by Austin, Gareth
rIa1 London SChool ·Of Economics & Political Science 
mJJ WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 
SCALE BIAS & STATE BUILDING: AN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, 
POLITICAL SYSTEMS & ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
IN TROPICAL AFRICA 
Gareth Austin 
Number: 6/92 
_ June 1992 
I 
Working Paper No. 6/92 
Scale Bias and State-Building: an Historical 
Perspective on Government Intervention, Political 
Systems and Economic Performance 
in Tropical Africa 
Gareth Austin 
©Gareth Austin, 
Economic History Department, 
London School of Economics. 
June 1992 
Gareth Austin 
Department of Economic History 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
United Kingdom 
Phone: +44 (0)71 955 7068 
" 
Fax: +44 (0)71 955 7730 
Additional copies of this working paper are available at a cost of £2.50. Cheques 
should be made payable to 'Department of Economic History, LSE' and sent to 
the Departmental Secretary at the address above. 
SCALE BIAS AND STATE-BUILDING: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE IN TROPICAL AFRICA 1 
Over the last decade the trend of opinion and political pressure, outside and 
inside Africa, has been strongly in favour of liberalism as a framework for 
economic development. In the early 1980s economic liberalism, i.e. belief in the 
social efficiency of market forces, became increasingly influential. with the 
publication of the Berg Report (World Bank 1981 ) and the adoption of Structural 
Adjustment policies by one African country after another. Since 1989, inspired 
partly by the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe and partly by changes 
within Africa, the tide of internal and external pressure has been running strongly 
in support of political liberalism in the sense of pluralist democracy. There is 
today a widespread feeling that while the economic liberalisation was introduced 
by the prevailing military and one-party governments of the 1980s, political 
liberalisation is the best guarantee that the economic reforms will last and will be 
used to their full potential. 
Th is mood contrasts with the previous consensus, again within and without 
Africa, that the state was necessarily the main force for economic modernisation 
in "traditional" societies, and that the political stability required for such economic 
progress could be provided only by some sort of authoritarian government. 
Indeed, the entire period from the Second World War until the early 1980s, and 
especially since independence in the respective countries, had been characterised 
by a growth of government intervention in African economies. Meanwhile, post-
colonial democratic constitutions were overthrown by military coups or converted 
into one-party systems. Until 1991 not one government in mainland tropical Africa 
had given up power through electoral defeat. 
It is necessary to ask whether the growth of belief in the applicability of 
"western" systems to Africa (and the whole world) is merely an exaggerated 
react ion against the discredited practices of the recent past in Africa, a reaction 
perhaps over-encouraged by the present enormous (and infectious) self-confidence 
of Western societies.! This article considers the effects of government 
intcrvc ntions and of the nature of political systems on economic performance 
between South Africa and the Sahara. Specifically, I compared the twelve 
countries in the region which have populations of ten million or more, though I 
refer to others where their experiences are particularly pertinent to the discussion. 
Together, the twelve most populous countries had about 340 million people in 
mid-1988, which constituted nearly three-quarters of the region 's total. The 
emphasis is on the period since the restoration of independence in most of Africa 
(1956-63), set in the context of precolonial and colonial experiences. 
Table I 
The twelve most populous countries in tropical Africa: 
population and output 
Population GNP per head 
Mean annual Growth Dollars Growth 
(millions) rate (%) rate (%) 
mid-1988 1965-80 1965-80 1988 
Nigeria l 110.1.. 2.5 290 0.9 
Ethiopia 47.4 2.7 120 -0.1 
Zaire 33.4 2.8 170 -2.1 
Tanzania 24.7 3.3 160 -0.5 
Sudan 23.8 2.8 480 0.0 
Kenya 22.4 3.6 370 1.9 
Uganda 16.2 2.9 280 -3.1 
Mozambique 14.9 2.5 100 
Ghana 14.0 2.2 400 -1.6 
Cameroon 11.2 2.7 10tO 3.7 
Cote d'Ivoire 11.2 4.1 770 0.9 
Madagascar 10.9 2.5 190 -1.8 
Source: World Bank 1990. 
The early parts of the paper review the responsiveness of African producers 
and traders to market signals and discuss their interaction with political power and 
the interests supported by the state, from precolonial times (especially since 1700) 
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to the outbreak of the Second World War. Then the focus shifts to the subsequent 
growth of state intervention (to c.1980). 1 distinguish different kinds of 
government intervention and examine their contributions to both the failures and 
achievements of post-colonial economies. A major theme throughout the paper 
is the continuity and consequences of scale bias in government policy. The final 
section considers the prospects and possible economic effects of establishing 
effective democratic control over government actions. 
African responsiveness to market forces in the precolonial and colonial periods, 
to 1939 
The traditional view of the economic behaviour of precolonial Africans. and of 
African peasants· up to the present, is that it was and is unresponsive to market 
signals. In the light of research over the last three decades, most economic 
historians reject this view. Within the constraint of ensuring food security. African 
producers (and consumers) showed a very high propensity to use scarce resources 
in ways consistent with income maximisation. At I!)ast. this seems to have been as 
true there as it is in any society: as elsewhere, local and temporal variations in 
both situation and culture affected the precise shape of the response curve.s 
Much evidence has been assembled of general price-responsiveness 111 
precolonial economies. One example is the growth of the trade in kola nuts from 
the kingdom of Asante (now in Ghana) to the Sokoto Caliphate (centred in the 
north of what is now Nigeria) after the latter state had been created in a 
revolutionary Islamic jihad in 1803-7. Kola (which contains caffeine) was the only 
stimulant permitted in the Caliphate. The increasing prosperity of the new state 
was expressed in a rising price for kola nuts, which was followed by a growth in 
the volume of nuts collected in the Asante forests (source of the most favoured 
nuts) and sold to Hausa traders from Kano and other towns in the Caliphate 
(Lovejoy 1980). 
The institutional framework does not seem to have posed powerful barriers 
to optimising responses to market signals. Exchange was facilitated by the 
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wiuespread use of "general-purpose" currencies, as opposed to "special-purpose" 
t:Urren l:ies which restri l:t it (e .g. Latham 1971 , Hogendorn and Johnson 1986). 
There was rarely a factor market in land, but this reflected a general availability 
or land , so that in economic terms it was almost a free good. Where local 
sl:arcities deve loped, rent or even sale evolved (e.g. Wilson 1990). Long-distance 
trade was stimulated by the institution of the ethnic and/or Muslim "trading 
diaspora", a "moral community" of traders dispersed along the length of a route 
within which honest commercial practice could be expected and enforced, and 
thus credit guaranteed (Cohen 1971; Curtin 1975; Austin [forthcoming]). 
Conventional social attitudes to self-enrichment varied, but even where they were 
hostile they were not necessarily a major constraint on economic activity. Bobangi 
raiders on the Congo River in the nineteenth century seem to have believed the 
orthodox view ill their local culture, that the acquisition of wealth was a zero-sum 
game in which the only way to succeed was witchcraft. But neither fear of 
retribution nor any sense of guilt was enough to deter them from the pursuit of 
profit! (Harms 1981 , ch. 11 ; cf ... Gerschenkron 1962, ch. 3). 
In much of early colonial Africa the most striking example of not only 
responsiveness to price signals, but also of entrepreneurship, came from the 
Africans largely responsible for the "cash-crop revolution". Among the twelve 
countries with which we are most concerned, this was most successful in Nigeria 
and the Gold Coast (Ghana), who very rapidly became major agricultural 
exporters (or in the case of eastern Nigeria, developed further the palm products 
trade established over the previous century). In northern Nigeria Hausa farmers 
and merchants defied colonial pressure to produce cotton for export on a large 
scale, and, at the initiative of and with credit from Hausa merchants, planted 
groundnuts (peanuts) instead. Exports began in 1912 and reached 12,000 tonnes 
in their second season, despite a catastrophic drought (Hogendorn 1978). Gold 
Coast cocoa exports rose from 40 kg. in 1890, became the world's biggest in 1911 , 
and then quadrupled its annual output to over 200,000 tonnes in 1923. The 
pioneer cocoa farmers were planting an exotic crop, on land which they often had 
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to buy or rent, and on which no return could be expected for several years (Hill 
1963). When they switched to cocoa. often it was not from leisure but in search 
of a more lucrative alternative to existing non-food economic activities such as 
gold mining or long-distance trading (Austin 1984).6 This was entrepreneurship: 
identifying opportunity, assembling the factors of production and taking risks in 
the course of a long-term investment (Berry 1975). The biggest cash-crop 
expansions came in West Africa, and there is a traditional argument that East and 
Southern Africans tended to be less market-oriented than West Africans. perhaps 
because of less intensive (though at least as ancient) involvement in world trade 
before the nineteenth century. It is true that precolonial trade evidently was more 
intensive in the west, but much (or even most: Eltis and Jennings 1988) of this was 
internal. The other regions of tropical Africa were (even) less densely populated 
than West Africa, which may well have impeded the growth of demand and labour 
supply. Where there was a solution, the market response was clear: the Zambezi 
Valley offered relatively low-cost transport between the coast and producers and 
markets in the interior, and this was an ancient highway of trade on a large scale. 
In the colonial period, outside as well as within West Africa, indigenOl~s farmers 
took opportunities for increasing their incomes where they occurred. Thus in 
Uganda, a colony relatively free from European appropriations of land, African 
chiefs and farmers entered vigorously into cash-crop production, albeit here with 
strong initial colonial encouragement (Ehrlich 1965; Nayenga 1981). I n all these 
cases, farmers were of course only willing to embark on export agriculture as long 
as it did not imperil their own food security. Cotton often did, by competing with 
food crops during the planting season (Tosh 1980). For this reason colonial 
governments often resorted to coercion to induce peasants to grow cotton (notably 
in parts of French West Africa and Mozambique). Significantly, these cases of 
coerced cash-cropping produced only a fraction of the output from the cocoa belts 
of Nigeria and the Gold Coast, where farmers did not even have the pressure of 
direct taxation to push them into export agriculture. Meanwhile in what is now 
Zimbabwe (as in South Africa) the market opportunities for Africans lay mainly 
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ill producing food crops for sa le to the expanding towns. They seized these 
OPPOrlUllilies, until the interests of white settlers and milling companies moved 
lht: slale to de ny Africans access (except as employees of white farmers) to most 
of the lands they had used to produce a marketable surplus above their 
subsistcnce nceds (Arrighi 1970). 
If Africans were as likely as anyone else to optimise where they could, we still 
have to account for the technical simplicity of most precolonial African technology 
compared to its counterparts in eighteenth-century India, China or Europe.7 This 
needs to be seen in the context of the availability of labour in African tropical 
agriculture. It is widely accepted that, in general, in precolonial times agricultural 
output in the region was constrained by a shortage of labour rather than land 
(lIopkins 1973; van Zwanenberg with King 1975, ch.l). This was partly because 
population densi.ties seem to have been low in relation to the carrying capacity of 
the land , with the prevailing technology. But it was also because of the relative 
brevity of the rains, especially in savanna zones (Tosh 1980). Indeed, it may be 
said that labour scarcity was ,primarily a wet (planting and weeding) season 
phenome non only: the labour force required to do a given amount of planting 
could not be fully occupied for the whole of the dry season simply in tending that 
farm . Thus wet season scarcity was combined with potential under-employment 
in the dry season. 
Combined with the evident scarcity of capital, the scarcity of wet season 
labour accounts for farmers' preference for land-extensive production, manifested 
in the non-use of the heavy plough (which would require laborious removal of big 
tree-stumps, an unnecessary task if the plough was not used) and the frequency 
of land rotation (with long fallow periods if possible) rather than permanent 
cultivation. In tropical African agriculture, greater intensity usually did not mean 
greater efficiency. This was doubly true when one considers the fragility of the 
tropical environment: the thin band of fertile soil could be easily removed by 
ploughing or permanent cultivation. There were major experiments in more 
intensive cultivation, for example terracing by hill farmers (who had fled from 
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slave raids) in Nigeria and irrigation systems in arid parts of the Rift Valley of 
East Africa, but these seem to have been specialised responses to local pressures 
and were abandoned when the peoples concerned either were able to return to 
extensive methods or were forced to move because of deterioration of the local 
environment precisely as a result of their "over-use" of the land and water 
resources (Hopkins 1973; Sutton 1984; cf. Hogendorn and Scott 1981). So, rather 
than increasing the capital- or labour-intensity of agriculture (cf. Bray 1986), the 
main direction of agricultural innovation over the centuries lay elsewhere, in the 
discovery and diffusion of new varieties of existing crops, and the adoption of 
exotic crops from Asia and the Americas. Arguably the greatest significance of 
these extensions to the farmers ' crop repertoires lay in the fact that they 
ameliorated the constraints imposed by the seasonal distribution of rainfall. For 
example, the drought-resistant properties of cassava (manioc) made it useful as 
a famine reserve. 
Conversely, the low opportunity cost of dry season labour accounts for the fact 
that outside agriculture, precolonial technology CQuld be highly labour-intensive, 
for example in gold mining and in the preference for the narrow handloom rather 
than the broader one (producing larger output per weaver-hour) used in India 
(Curtin 1973; 10hnson 1978). The environment posed constraints on non-
agricultural as well as agricultural technology, notably in the form of sleeping 
sickness (trypanosomiasis), which greatly restricted the areas in which haulage 
animals could live, thus restricting the scope for using the wheel in transport. 
Where the environment permitted and market demand became sufficient to justify 
the capital expenditure, Africans were ready to adopt both the plough and the 
animal-drawn wheeled cart: this happened in Natal (significantly, south of the 
tropics) in the mid-nineteenth century (Etherington 1978). 
Given the widespread responsiveness to market forces, the basic constraints 
on the long-term expansion of market exchange within African economies were 
the scarcities of population (limiting demand as well as labour supply) and capital 
plus the difficulties of the physical environment. Access to imported industrial 
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technology am! l:<Jpital nlight <J ssist in transport and certain other sectors, though 
experienl:c was to show that it had little to offer in agriculture (at least while land 
was relatively abundant). Ilowever. the distribution of coercive power and political 
authority within Africa. and the use that these resources were put to. also had a 
crucial innuence on the directions in which African economies evolved. 
Government and the market in the precolonial and colonial periods (to 1939) 
Ultimately, economic development entails specialisation, and thus complex and 
impersonal exchanges: and government is necessary to regulate these transactions 
(compare North 1979). However, it has been suggested that "the most distinctively 
African contribution to human history could be said to have been precisely the 
civilized art of living fairly peaceably together not in states" (Lonsdale 1981: 139). 
Moreover, the ethnic trading diaspora was an institution which performed some 
of the functions which economics literature usually reserves to government (Cohen 
1971). This was necessary because state-building was hard in a lightly-populated 
sub-continent: it was difficult to. make the producers provide a surplus capable of 
supporting the officials needed to enforce the exaction (cf. Hopkins 1986). States 
did of course emerge, and imposed some degree of control over (often large) 
parts of the territories of all twelve of the contemporary states on which we are 
focusing. But they seem to have been poor by comparison with at least some 
Asian and European states. For example, most had to rely on dry-season 
mobilisation of farmers for the bulk of their fighting strength. The colonial 
administrations likewise found difficulty raising taxes in conditions where flight 
was a much-practised option (Asiwaju 1976), and before 1945 they generally got 
little subsidy from their superiors in Europe. 
Given the relative scarcity of labour, relatively poor rulers tended to use their 
coercive capacities to obtain labour by force. Precolonial rulers were to some 
extent obliged by the logic of an arms race in imported weaponry (horses from 
North Africa. firearms from Europe) to sell slaves to alien merchants, because the 
price of a slave purchased far more in imports than would his or her output if he 
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or she was retained locally (Fenoaltea 1988). The response of African suppliers 
to the external demand for slaves was another example of an elastic supply 
response in African economies, but obviously one which reflected the interests of 
the political-military and mercantile elites rather than of the population as a 
whole. Exporting people from economies that were short of labourers and 
consumers (not to mention particular skills and talents) made no long-term sense 
for the depleted societies. However, most states that traded slaves to Europeans 
or Arabs confined their sales to aliens, whom they had captured themselves or 
bought from "wholesaler" captors in the hinterland. Their own subjects could thus 
feel at least relatively secure, and could continue provisioning themselves and the 
court. Moreover, some of the captives (especially females) were added to the 
retinues of the ruler or his richer and more powerful subjects, increasing their 
own resources and also the productive and reproductive capacity of the state as 
a whole (Lovejoy 1983). Thus precolonial rulers (and ruling "classes") tended to 
resort to coercion of labour to solve their resource problems, notably the scarcity 
and thus potentially high supply price of labou~. and the shortage of import-
purchasing power. 
Colonial governments similarly tended to use coercion to reduce the supply 
price of labour, for government work or to subsidise white settlers or mining 
companies. The main methods were direct taxation (paid in cash) and compulsory 
labour, combined with appropriation of much land in an attempt to deny Africans 
the option of growing crops for the market as an alternative to selling labour 
(Arrighi 1970; Kanogo 1987). The attempt had much success. but less so the 
longer it continued (e.g. Ranger 1985, ch. 2). These methods were of course 
applied primarily in those colonies dominated by settlers (Kenya. Madagascar, 
Cote d')voire) and/or by European plantations or mines (Mozambique. Belgian 
Congo. parts of Cameroon). Compulsory labour was less frequent and direct 
taxation less widespread in the so-called "peasant colonies", where Africans 
retained control of the land (Nigeria. the Gold Coast. Uganda. Sudan. and most 
of Tanganyika). 
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These uses of coe rcion worked in favour of large-sca le suppliers (producers 
Of traders). The slave trade was made possible by the coercive power of military 
elites, and the nature of the staple cOllllllodity (coming in the large unit of the 
whole person, and liable to escape Of revolt) excluded small-scale businesses frolll 
the trade (lIopkins 1973, cid). In the colonial period, white settlers achieved 
domination of agricultural markets in Kenya and Cote d'lvoire largely through 
political rathe r than economic advantages of scale: their ability to win state 
support rather than higher productivity. 
It may be suggested that these government interventions, manipulating scarce 
labour in support of the politically powerful large suppliers, were at variance with 
any development strategy based on taking full advantage of the widespread 
responsiveness to market forces in the economies concerned, and taking full 
account of the ecological constraints on tropical agriculture in Africa. and the 
natural (non-coerced) factor ratios in the economies concerned. With the 
prevailing technologies up to 1939, and indeed largely up to the present, there 
were few economies of scale in. production. Indeed, with labour being relatively 
scarce (except when coerced), and therefore relatively expensive. large farms 
based on a hired work force were at a disadvantage (though many smallholders 
made partial use of hired labour, some to the extent that they are better regarded 
as small "capitalists" rather than "peasants": Austin 1988). Thus in Cote d' lvoire 
after the supply of forced labour was abolished in 1945, European settlers proved 
unable to withstand the competition of African smallholders in coffee and cocoa 
production. It is also arguable that a smallholder-based economy offered the best 
prospects - in strictly economic terms - for the growth of industry. The relatively 
wide distribution of income favoured the growth of mass markets (outside staple 
foods), which could stimulate tra(jers and small-scale manufacturing as well as 
factory production. 
The outline of a "smallholder-based path of development" began to emerge 
in coastal West Africa during the nineteenth century when the gradual decline of 
slave exports undermined the income and ultimately the coercive power of 
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militaristic chiefs and big merchants (Hopkins 1973. ch. 4; Law 1990). The export 
agriculture that began then was (as noted above) greatly extended after 
colonisation. Those areas which emerged as "peasant colonies" were those whose 
natural endowments were (in some cases with local exceptions) unattractive to 
European settlers and mining companies, and (partly because of that) were able 
to develop major export cultures from African farms (or who supplied migrant 
labour to African export producers). The rise of African export production 
strengthened the hand of those colonial officials who regarded African peasants 
as more conducive than European settlers to the achievement of politically 
tranquil and fiscally balanced colonies (with low costs of coercion and sizeable 
customs receipts from the imports purchased by cash-crop producers). However, 
the same colonial political calculations that allowed space (literal and metaphoric) 
to African cash-cropping also hindered the full achievement of its potential. 
Colon ial governments welcomed exports and revenue, but saw the continuation 
of the subsistence side of the peasant farmer's production as politically essential. 
They feared that further commercialisation wou.ld produce a class of landless 
labourers (raising the risk of rebellion). So administrators tried generally to 
preserve "communal" land tenure and hold back the pressure towards the renting, 
pledging and selling of land. In this they were largely unsuccessful, but they 
avoided giving peasants legally unambiguous individual title to land , which might 
have helped them to get loans from credit cooperatives and banks. rather than 
relying on informal-sector moneylenders. 
Scale bias is not the whole story of the role of precolonial and colonial 
governments in what we now call "development". It would be anachronistic to 
criticise precolonial states for not having "development" strategies until the 
unplanned industrialisation of Western Europe created the political need for such 
policies elsewhere. But what certain rulers (for instance, in the kingdoms of 
Asante in what is now Ghana and of Buganda in what is now Uganda) did do in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was to strengthen the authority and 
autonomy of central governments, and reduce the innuence of kinship-based 
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provincial chicftaincy. In retrospect, this may be seen as increasing the capacity 
of Ihe African slate to perform Ihe role of market referee. However, this was 
prohahly less a "bureaucratic revolution" establishing impersonal administration , 
than the evolution of "patrimonialism", that is, a system of government based on 
the personal authority of the ruler so that office is bestowed by the ruler in return 
for personal service to him.s In the nineteenth century, as the threat of colonial 
invasion increased, the rulers of two unusually wealthy states,9 Abysinnia 
(Ethiopia) and the Imerina kingdom (on Madagascar), tried to modernise their 
economies for military reasons, including by importing technical knowledge and 
starting to manufacture cannons. The Ethiopians did repulse the Italian invasion 
in 1896, but Madagascar fell to the French. Meanwhile, a different pattern of 
technological advance took place in the in the city and emirate of Kano, part of 
the Sokoto Caliphate. In the nineteenth century Kano was clearly the major 
centre of cotton textile and other craft production south of the Sahara. Part of the 
raw materials of raw cotton and dyes came from slave farms (Lovejoy 1978), so 
this was no case of simple I~issez-faire. But it is worth noting that Kano's 
commercial preeminence was at least reinforced by state encouragement of private 
enterprise, in the form of low or non-existent taxes on each phase of textile 
production and trade: something unique in the Caliphate. This encouraged 
investment, and there was considerable technical innovation, notably a change in 
dyeing technique which permitted significant economies of scale and thus lower 
unit costs (Shea 1975). 
Colonial administrations everywhere saw themselves as modernisers, but their 
first priorities had to be securing political control and balancing their local 
budgets. They were further constrained by political pressure from home and from 
European companies in Africa militating against any proposals for industrial 
development in the colonies that might threaten profits and employment back 
home. Their major contribution was of infrastructure (albeit often using African 
labour at below free market cost), especially railroads and motor roads (though 
in the cash-crop areas African farmers often took the initiative to undertake the 
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construction of the latter, and likewise were among the first lorry owners) (Hill 
1963). Colonial governments did some scientific research into the technical 
problems faced by African farmers, but the resulting recommendations were often 
inappropriate to the farmers' economic and ecological situations, notably by 
favouring more intensive cultivation, ignoring the relative scarcity of labour (which 
made it costly) and the relative abundance of land (which made it unnecessary) 
(e.g. Austin 1984). In food farming even more than with cash crops, the major 
stream of innovation was the gradual diffusion of new crops and new varieties 
from farmer to farmer (Hay 1976), often barely visibly to administrators. This 
process of learning from individual and shared experience has continued 
vigorously to the present (Richards 1985). 
During the war an un heralded revolution in African public finance had begun 
in British colonies: the use of statutory producer price stabilisation schemes 
(usually run by government marketing boards) for taxation of export producers. 
Initially as a wartime expedient, the government took monopoly control over crop 
exports, fIXed the producer price at below fre~. market levels, and kept the 
difference. Similar systems were subsequently introduced in the other countries, 
though until 1964 they were relatively unimportant as fiscal tools because (from 
1931-2 for certain crops) France gave a price premium to agricultural imports 
from its colonies and former colonies, which enabled the marketing boards to 
accumulate surpluses without necessarily pushing the producer price much (if at 
all) below the world price. Probably only "feudal" Ethiopia had previously matched 
the levels of agricultural taxation that price stabilisation made available. For a few 
countries mineral exports were (or became) a major source of public revenue, but 
the marketing board was crucial in financing the growth of government 
expenditure during the last two decades of colonial rule and in the first two 
decades afterwards. The state in tropical Africa was at least a lot less poor than 
it had been, and had the potential to achieve much more than before in what both 
colonialists and nationalists now agreed was its prime duty, economic 
development. 
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The enlargement of government intervention, from the late 19305 to c.1980 
I )uring the war colonial administrations in tropical Africa shared in the worldwide 
trcnd towards greater economic interventionism, and afterwards they came under 
further pressure to spend because of the growing independence movements. As 
nationalist politicians approached and then achieved power, they both bid up and 
where possible implemented the spending promises. 
African demands for public expenditure came from voters themselves, from 
politicians competing for votes or military support, and from African businessmen. 
Many of the latter "expected the Government to be their banker", providing large 
credits on generous terms (Esseks 1971: 13). Some governments, notably Nigeria 
in the 1960s (and in the last colonial years, the late 1950s) encouraged with 
subsidies and tariff protection the development of indigenous private industry, a 
policy which Schatz termed "nurture capitalism" (Schatz 1977; cf. Adejugbe 1979). 
On the other hand , radicals such as Nkrumah in Ghana , especially after 1961 (to 
1966) and Nyerere in Tanzania, especially after 1967 (to 1985), tended to see 
government intervention preci~ely as a non-capitalist route to development, 
preempting the emergence of a wealthy indigenous business class. 
Certainly. governments found that the possibility of exploiting the marketing 
boards for fiscal purposes was turned from a temptation into an imperative. 
Colonial administrations began to spend more after 1945, and spent more still in 
those cases (notably the Gold Coast and Nigeria) where (in the 1950s) nationalists 
were conceded a share in government prior to independence. To take the case of 
the largest economy, central government expenditure in Nigeria had been in the 
£6-7 million sterling range in the 1920s and 1930s, it reached £JOm. in the fiscal 
year 1950-51, and £ 114m. in the last full fiscal year before independence, ] 959-60 
(Ekundare 1973). 
Of the twelve most populous countries in the region, all but two achieved 
independence between 1956 and 1963. The exceptions were non-colonial 
(Mussolini 's occupation apart) Ethiopia and the Portuguese colony of 
Mozambique. which became independent in 1975. Both participated in the general 
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upward trend of government expenditure as a proportion of national output that 
followed during the I 960s. 1970s and, indeed. the 1980s. It should be noted that 
this uniformity was the result not only of public demands for development 
programmes of all kinds, but also of high military spending in both Ethiopia and 
Mozambique (as well as in some of the others). The trend has not been without 
deviations, as Table 2 shows. But the general direction is clear. For the ten 
countries for which we have complete data for 1960. 1980 and 1988. the mean 
share of General Government Consumption in Gross Domestic Product rose from 
10.9% in 1960 to 12.8% in 1980, and in the 1980s (despite the introduction of 
economic liberalisation policies in some countries) it rose even faster to 16.2% in 
1988. 
Table 2 
Share or general government consumption in gross domestic product 
(%) 
1960 1980 1988 
Mozambique 11 11 22 
Ethiopia 8 15 24 
Tanzania 9 13 12 
Zaire 18 9 24 
Madagascar 20 17 12 
Uganda 9 8 
Nigeria 6 9 12 
Kenya 11 20 19 
Ghana 10 11 9 
Sudan 6 16 9 
Cote d 'Ivoire 10 18 19 
Cameroon 9 10 
Sources: World Bank 1981, 1989A, 1990. 
However, public expenditure is not a reliable proxy for the general degree 
of government intervention in an economy. It would be ironic to refer to "the 
ove r-development of the state"IO in Africa on the basis of expenditure, since even 
IS 
by IYX() th e General Government Consumption/Gross Domestic Product ratios 
south of the Sahara were much lower than in the GECD countries, which are 
usually considered to be more market-oriented. Indeed , even within Africa the 
more regulated economies were not necessarily those with the highest GGC/GDP 
ratios: in 1980 Kenya's ratio was much higher than Tanzania's, and likewise Cote 
d ' lvoire's was much higher than Ghana's. Thus government expenditure must not 
be confused with government regulation of the economy, even though the former 
is made possible by a degree of the laller. 
In trying to explain the performances of tropical African economies from 
independence to the early 1980s, and in particular the differences among them, 
there is much evidence that the crucial distinction is in the degree and form of 
government regulation of economic activity. None of the governments concerned 
could be described as following laissez-faire policies during the period, so we need 
a criterion for distinguishing those who went furthest in trying to regulate the 
market from the others. In all twelve of the economies with which we are 
concerned the state fixed at leCj,St some major agricultural prices, owned at least 
a large proportion of the large enterprises and imposed a generally increasing 
body of market regulations. However, nine of them also (for part or most of the 
period) operated currencies which were not freely convertible internationally, and 
became substantially over-valued. 1I The three who very largely maintained free 
convertibility were Kenya, Cote d'lvoire and Cameroon (the latter two through 
membership of the franc zone). We will now consider the significance of this 
distinction in the next section, in relation to the evidence about the economic 
performance of the twelve countries. 
Post-colonial economic growth and "excessive" government intervention 
The growth record of post-colonial tropical Africa is widely regarded as poor, both 
by Africans and outsiders. All the twelve most populous countries in the region 
still have only small fractions of the average incomes per head enjoyed in the 
industrialised world. This remains true even given that the standard GNP measure 
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probably undercounts average African incomes. I! Growth per head over the 
whole period since independence has been negative or minimal in most of these 
economies. This section asks in what sense, if any, government intervention was 
responsible for the poor overall performance. A possible clue is the fact that 
amidst the general calamities certain economies did achieve considerable growth, 
at least for much of the period. 
Table 3 
Average annual growth rates or per capita output 
(%; constant prices) 
GDP GDP GDP GNP 
1965-73 1973-80 1980-87 1965-88 
Mozambique -8.2 
Ethiopia 1.1 0.0 -1.6 -0.1 
Tanzania 2.0 -0.9 1.7 -0.5 
Zaire 0.3 -4.7 -2.5 -2.1 
Madagascar 1.1 -\.5 -3.7 -\.8 
Uganda 0.7 -6.2 -2.4 -3.1 
Nigeria 5.3 \,2 -4 .8 0.9 
Kenya 4.7 1.3 -0.9 1.9 
Ghana \.0 -2.1 -2.0 -\.6 
Sudan -1.7 3.5 -4.3 0.0 
Cote d'Ivoire 4.5 \,2 -3.0 0.9 
Cameroon -0.4 5.7 4.5 3.7 
Unweighted means 
(excl. Mozambique) \,7 -0.2 -\.7 -0.1 
Source: World Bank 1989B, 1990/a uthor's calculations. 
We must first eliminate from the comparison those countries whose relative 
performance was largely a function of causes other than (and not primarily and 
directly related to) the scale and form of government intervention. We can then 
compare the more and the less successful of the remaining countries, and examine 
whether the differences in performance among them can be attributed to 
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differences in the pattern of govcrnment intervention. The most notable 
"exogcnous" innuences were natural endowment. external economic conditions. 
and wars. It is arguable that tropical Africa generally suffers from severe 
environmental constraints compared to some other regions, and it is clear that 
tropical Africa as a whole suffered declining net barter terms of trade l3 in the 
I 980s. However, what is relevant here is only the (major) variations in such 
respects among the most populous countries. For example, it is clear that changes 
in the external economic environment (notably in th'e net barter terms of trade 
and interest rates) made economic growth more difficult for most countries in the 
1980s than it had been in the 1960s and even the 1970s. But they cannot explain 
the often great differences in the growth record of economies operating in similar 
external circumstances: such as among the non-oil producing, beverage crop-
exporting majority of these economies during the 1970s. A clear example was the 
contrasting trends in export volumes between two neighbours with similar natural 
endowments, Ghana and Cote d'lvoire. Between 1971 and 1980 Ghana's net 
barter terms of trade rose at an average of 6.9% a year, Cote d ' lvoire's at a more 
modest 3.0%. Yet Ghana's income terms of trade actually fell, at an annual 
average of -0.8% , while Cote d' lvoire's raced ahead at 8.2% (World Bank 1981: 
155). 
Several of the most populous countries in the region were involved in external 
or internal wars during the period, and five of them had wars which for several 
years severely disrupted economic activity over a large part of the country, In 
terms of the three sub-periods shown in Table 3, this applied to Sudan and 
Nigeria in the first. Ethiopia and Uganda in the second, and Ethiopia , Uganda 
and Sudan in the third, while Mozambique was war-torn virtually throughout. 
That the current economic impact of war ,was disasterous can reasonably be 
assumed from the figures for Sudan, Ethiopa and Uganda, by comparing the 
growth rate during the two war-affected sub-periods which each experienced, with 
their peaceful one. The huge famines of the 1980s in Mozambique, Sudan and 
Ethiopia were partly the result of rain failure, but that this led to such high 
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mortality was in large part because they occurred during wars. Without the wars 
most of the twelve most populous economies would at least have avoided actual 
decline in their per capita outputs during 1973-88 as a whole. The Nigerian 
economy was one which grew rapidly during a sub-period (1965-73) during which 
it had sustained a prolonged civil war (1967-70). This of course was because of 
increased volume and, with the OPEC price rise of 1973, value of oil output. 
Besides Nigeria the only major oil-exporter among the twelve most populous 
countries was Cameroon in the 1980s.1 4 
Leaving aside the war-torn economies and the oil exporters, we are left with 
seven economies. Four achieved only minimal growth: Tanzania, Ghana, Zaire 
and Madagascar. Three did rather better: Kenya , Cote d'(voire and Cameroon 
(which is part of our comparison only until c.1980). Can this difference in 
performance between these two groups of economies be explained by differences 
in the extent and nature of government intervention? 
Success does not seem to be a matter of minimising government expenditure. 
For example in 1988 the Pearson 's correlation coefficient between the GCC/GDP 
ratio and GNP per head (data from World Bank 1990) for the twelve countries 
was -0.34, suggesting an inverse relationship, but so weak that is probably 
spurious. Rather, the crucial distinction seems to be the one made in the previous 
section. All these governments intervened extensively, notably through state 
enterprises and marketing boards who effectively taxed farmers, by keeping 
producer prices well below free market levels. The sharpest difference between 
the two groups of countries was that the three economies that achieved sustained 
(albeit, in the long term, slow) growth were the only ones who largely maintained 
convertible currencies. 
This is not likely to be coincidence, for the following reasons. First. paying 
export producers in over-valued currency constituted implicit taxation, which 
reduced the real value of the producer price to a small fraction of the world price. 
Compared to the extensive literature on marketing board surpluses. this point has 
tended to be under-emphasised. For an example of its importance, consider the 
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smuggling of cocoa across the Ghana-Togo border. At the official exchange rate 
cocoa producers in Ghana got a higher share of the world price than did their 
counterparts in neigboring Togo from at least 1975 until the start of the 1983-84 
crop year. Yet several thousands tons of Ghanaian cocoa were smuggled to Togo 
annually until Ghana began its series of devaluations in 1983. It is conceivably not 
coincidence that the year the Ghanaian currency began to return to more realistic 
official values, the Togolese authorities at last felt it necessary to pitch their 
producer price for the new season above Ghana's 'nominal one (figures from 
World Bank 1989A: 147. ISO). By reducing the incentive to produce for (legal) 
export. and reducing the purchasing power of the receipts from which future 
investment could be financed, currency over-valuation does much to explain why, 
for example, during a decade (1971 -80) when they enjoyed rising net barter terms 
of trade, Ghana and Tanzania produced falling exported volumes, whereas Cote 
d'lvoire, Kenya and Cameroon achieved rising ones (World Bank 1981: 155). 
Second, currency over-valuation reduces international competitiveness. This may 
be unimportant for tropical Africa's staple exports, whose values are typically 
determined in the overseas markets rather than in African currencies. But it 
virtually eliminated any chance of developing manufacturing exports, and 
increased the dependence of domestic manufacturers on government protection. 
Finally, a non-convertible currency often came to be simply part of a package of 
far-reaching price and quantity controls, for example on imports and foodstuffs. 
By their nature, all these controls could be enforced only by a host of police, 
soldiers and civil servants. This was expensive, and an invitation to law-breaking 
and bribery which almost invariably rendered the rules effective only in ensuring 
that goods were scarce for those who could not afford to buy them at parallel 
market prices. Indeed, though usually introduced in the name of those too poor 
to buy goods on the free market, such control regimes notoriously tended to work 
as a regressive rationing system. giving the rich and well-connected monopolistic 
access to those scarce commodities that no trader would sell at the legal rate. The 
economic weaknesses of such control systems have been much reported, but what 
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has not been given sufficient attention is their consequences for responsible 
citizenship and civil liberty. The control regimes seemed inevitably to "educate" 
the population to accept law-breaking as necessary to survival. thus weakening 
respect for law itself and forcing citizens to choose between hypocrisy and 
cynicism (a brilliant early evocation of this was Armah 1968). Moreover, large 
numbers of police and soldiers wer~ employed in stopping cars and, especially. 
public transport and lorries. in order to check for unauthorised holdings offoreign 
currency, or inadequately documented trade goods. Such intrusive methods often 
spilled over into profligate wasting of citizens' time and in some instances led to 
physical intimidation and even violence against drivers and passengers. Traders 
and lorry-drivers were deliberately delayed or bullied until they paid bribes. 
Besides the infringement of civil liberty, such procedures were directly wasteful 
in economic terms. Simply. large numbers of state employees were engaged in 
obstructing private citizens as they went about their lives and tried to support 
themselves. When the officials extorted money, this was an abuse of their 
authority: but in causing the initial obstruction they were (often) merely 
implementing the law. Road blocks, like some other state interventions •. were and 
are not confined to the most regulated economies in the region. But by definition, 
the most regulated economies have the most need for administrative enforcement, 
and thus tend to produce the most extreme abuses. IS 
The main losers from such infringements were the poor and politically 
uninfluential. This exemplifies a further point, that as in earlier periods. the 
central thrust of government interventions in the market since independence has 
tended to favour the "big man" at the expense of the small producer and trader. 
Except for Nigeria and Zaire. the most populous states in tropical Africa have 
relied primarily on their agricultural exports for government revenue. Since these 
exports were produced mainly by peasants and small capitalists, it has been they 
who contributed most of the revenue. However. though part of the revenues were 
used to fund public services for all, direct aid to businesses has generally been 
concentrated on large enterprises and powerful individuals. For example, in the 
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1970s in at least three countries substantial land transfers took place under 
indigenisation (Zaire) or irrigation and mechanisation schemes (savanna areas of 
Nigeria and Ghana). The intention was to establish big. "progressive" farms. and 
the beneficiaries were politically well-connected individuals. In the West African 
cases at least, these enterprises were privately profitable only because of large 
public subsidies, while the most efficient producers on the newly-irrigated lands 
in Ghana were peasants illegally squatting on their former lands (MacGaffey 1987; 
Andrae and Beckman 1985; Konings 1986). As before, political intervention rather 
than the free market has been the major source of dramatic inequalities between 
farmers in Africa . 
And as before, post-colonial political scale bias has been damaging 
economically. To some extent it is inevitable and appropriate that government 
support for manufacturing should assist large enterprises, given the high capital 
thresholds of many industries. But it was and is also important that African 
economies exploit their strengths: notably the enterprising characteristics of small-
scale African farmers and, indeed, "informal" manufacturers. The latter may lack 
influence with ministers, but supporting them may well give higher rates of return 
on access to foreign currency and other resources than support for a handful of 
local monopolies or near-monopolies (Elkan 1988). The general effect of the 
growth of state regulation of markets, and - within this framework - of public 
expenditure, was to channel people's economic rationality and entrepreneurship 
from the economy into (one might say) the political economy. The main 
opportunities of self-enrichment came less from economic competition than from 
access to the twin state resources of revenue and administrative control. Specific 
examples include both the legal and the illegal: government employment and 
contracts, the use of government assets (vehicles. buildings. labourers) for private 
purposes, and bribes "necessary" for the private individual to make progress in a 
heavily (if. in practice, often arbitrarily) regulated environment (Schatz 1984; 
Sandbrook 1985; Young and Turner 1985). 
Again as in earlier periods, government interventions which (arguably) 
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reduced economic growth were often rational for the holders of office. Market 
regulations rationing access to scarce resources (such as non-convertible currencies 
and import licences) enable the authorities to discriminate in the distribution of 
these assets. This gives them opportunities for both financial gain ("rents", i.e. 
values created by administratively-imposed restrictions in supply) and political 
advantage. Politically, many of the civil and military politicians of post-colonial 
Africa were as quick as some of their counterparts elsewhere to see the potential 
of selective distribution of government largesse (from clinics to subsidised farm 
inputs) for recruiting and maintaining the support of constituencies, whether of 
voters or soldiers (Bates 1981; Joseph 1987; Young and Turner 1985). Thus, as 
in the slave trading and colonial periods economic growth has been hindered 
(though with more subtle and less violent means) by a divergence of interests 
between the holders of political power and the population as a whole. 
Also as in previous periods, since independence the major form of popular 
resistance to adverse government interventions has been what Hirschman called 
the option of "exit" from organisations failing to satisfy their members (Hirschman 
1970). Large numbers of people emigrated, temporarily or permane.nently, to 
economically friendlier states. Even more widespread was the proliferation of 
parallel markets, in which farmers and traders voted with their commodities 
against over-valued currencies and official domestic prices. In the 1970s and early 
1980s this phenomenon was particularly strong in Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and 
Ghana (Hyden 1980; Bunker 1987; MacGaffey 1987; Azarya and Chazan 1987). 
By definition, these parallel markets sapped government revenues: which made 
it harder for governments to make positive, active contributions to economic 
development. 
What the state has contributed to economic performance since independence, and 
possible lessons for the future 
However, the record of government in post-colonial development is not all bad. 
The expenditure and organisation provided by governments must be given much 
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of the credit for the great improvements in health, education and transport that 
have been achieved in tropical Africa since independence. Between 1960 and 1980 
infant mortality rates and average life expectancy greatly improved in the twelve 
countries, though the trends were reversed in certain countries (in four for infant 
mortality, in one - Uganda - for life expectancy) in the 1980s. probably largely 
because of the spread of AIDS. Over the thirty years since 1960 there has been 
a massive increase in school enrolment at all levels. Thus the physical and 
educational fitness of the current and future working population has been 
enhanced. There has also been a general increase in road density. which is 
perhaps the most basic contribution which (largely) public investment could make 
to the economic infrastructure. 
We should note that the governments which have presided over the biggest 
quantifiable improvements in health and education, and over the construction of 
the densest road networks, have mostly not been the "super-interveners" (with the 
defining feature of non-convertible currencies). Rather, it has been largely the 
three governments which have applied the least extensive regulations to their 
markets. On the basic public health indicators used above, all three of them have 
improved more rapidly since independence than has their neighbouring 
comparator. For example. in infant survival rate by 1988 Cote d'Ivoire had passed 
Ghana's infant survival rate, Cameroon had similarly over-taken Zaire, and Kenya 
had passed and far surpassed Tanzania (in each case the economy which was to 
be less-regulated had begun with the worse public health figures in 1960) (World 
Bank 1982, 1990). In school enrolment, of the eleven countries for which data are 
available for 1980. Cameroon and Kenya had the highest rates for primary school 
(as they did in 1980, except for a very high rate for Madagascar) (World Bank 
1981 , ]990). Meanwhile, as of c.1988 Cote d'lvoire and Cameroon had the lowest 
ratios of physical area to total length of roads, though Kenya 'S was less 
outstanding (calculated from World Bank 1989A). It must be emphasised that, in 
general, though the governments who have presided over the greatest 
improvements in these public services have been those least inclined to regulate 
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the market. they have used public expenditure as the main source of investment 
in each of these sectors. For example. the Kenyan government devoted a higher 
proportion of its expenditure to education in. for example, 1972 and 1988. than 
did any of the others for whom figures are available (World Bank 1990). 
Generally, public services have been improved most not by the absence of 
government expenditure, but by g~vernments being sufficiently wealthy and 
focused to channel money to them. This is consistent with the tendency for the 
share of government spending in nati~nal product to be higher in richer countries: 
an observation which is true within tropical Africa as well as more generally 
(Lindauer 1988). 
Even the less regulation-minded governments in post-colonial tropical Africa 
have also intervened more directly in production, in both agriculture and 
manufacturing. In both cases the failures are better known than the successes. In 
both sectors most public enterprises were economically inefficient vehicles for 
political patronage. Government agricultural experts tended to repeat colonial 
errors in failing to organise their research and advice within the context of the 
ecological and economic constraints facing the farmers (Richards ]985), while 
input subsidies were largely wasted except in those few countries where real 
producer prices were allowed to be high enough to motivate the farmers. 
Meanwhile, all the governments sought some degree of industrial development. 
In the 1960s and most commonly since, ownership was either public or foreign, 
because of the high capital threshold. the scarcity of "lumpy" private funds, and 
the lack of market institutions capable of bulking lots of small investments. These 
ventures were loaded with difficulties, notably dependence on imports for capital 
goods and often other inputs, small domestic markets, the self-imposed export 
barrier of over-valued exchange rates,16 and the fact that the costs of state 
protection and subsidy included lower incentives to agricultural export producers, 
consolidating the foreign exchange shortage. Many factories were destined to 
operate well below capacity because of shortage of imported inputs even more 
than of orders (Killick ]978; Rimmer ]984; Nyong'o ]988; Teal 1988). 
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Yet as Tahle 4 shows, there was substantial growth in African manufacturing, 
albeit from a low base (Sender and Smith 1986, ch.4; see also lIiffe 1983, ch.4) . 
Table 4 
Average annual growth rate of manufacturing output, 1965·88 
(%) 
1965-73 1973-80 1980-88 
Mozambique 
EVJiopia 8.8 2.6 3.7 
Tanzania 8.7 2.6 -2.5 
Zaire -5.7 1.7 
Madagascar 
Uganda 4.0 -12.4 2.3 
Nigeria 15.0 17.2 -2.9 
Kenya 12.4 6.9 4.6 
Ghana 6.5 -2.8 3.1 
Sudan 6.7 5.0 
Cote d'lvoire 10.9 8.3 8.2 
Cameroon 7.4 9.0 6.2 
Sources: World Bank 1981, 19898. 
In the short run the diversion of tax-payers' and consumers' money into 
investments in a sector in which tropical Africa was at a major comparative 
disadvantage, was costly and, in some cases, perhaps counterproductive. Where 
finished products come from local rather than overseas factories, there has been 
at least some employment of local labour and materials, and the possibility of tax 
revenue (for the Ivorian case, see Fieldhouse 1986: 194-9). Foreign firms were 
obliged to sell substantial equity to either the host state (as in Cote d'Ivoire) or 
to host country nationals (as in Nigeria), while partnerships with foreign 
enterprises have often been of genuine benefit to African businesses (Kennedy 
1988: 116-19). Some manufacturing projects resulted in genuinely competitive 
products in local markets (given natural protection, for example beer) or even for 
export (processed agricultural and wood products).17 Tropical Africa needs to 
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develop new areas of comparative advantage in international trade. because 
demand for most of the products in which she is at present competitive is 
constrained by low income elasticity and/or the availability of substitutes. III this 
context it is hard to see a future development strategy for the region that does not 
involve substantial development of manufacturing in those countries or trading 
blocks with relatively large markets. Whatever its long-term importance, the start 
that tropical Africa has made in modern manufacturing has been made possible 
by government intervention. It is fair to assume that without the protection, 
subsidy and participation of governments the consumer demand created by 
primary product exports would have been met largely by imports. Indeed, this 
began before the end of colonial rule, with pressure from some of the European 
settlers and workers securing government support for industrial ventures in 
Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Kenya , and in the 1950s with foreign 
companies establishing factories in colonies that were approaching independence, 
partly in anticipation of future tariff barriers. Since independence, in 
manufacturing as with GNP growth, the most successful economies (oil booms 
apart) have been the three less regulated ones (Table 4). But ag!lin, state 
interventio n has always been present. For example, it has been argued that in 
highly capitalist Kenya the government has intervened actively and effectively to 
encourage the growth of Kenyan businesses, notably in place of foreign ownership 
(Leys 1978, especially p. 251: for surveys of the debate see Beckman 1980, 
Kitching 1985). 
All tropical African economies certainly need to maintain and (subject to 
demand constraints) strengthen their existing areas of comparative advantage, 
which are most commonly in agriculture. Both by reducing local food prices and 
by their export earnings (minus tax, explicit and often implicit as noted above), 
African fa rmers increase the legal "entitlements" to food of both urban consumers 
and (given that they are not fully self-sufficient) themselves, thus reducing the 
incidence of under-nourishment (cf. Sen 1981). Moreover, by reducing imports 
and producing exports, they provide foreign exchange needed outside agriculture. 
27 
A lIIore prosperous smallholder-based agricultural sector would also contribute 
to the success o f the industrial strategy, by providing a larger home market. 
Assisted by public expenditure on education and infrastructure, the smallholder 
sector plus the trade and private transport networks that service it may also be 
lIIore fertile than before as a breeding-ground for small-scale manufacturers. 
Despite the generally poor record. scientists and farmers can cooperate, and it is 
fair to assume that government support for such cooperation will be essential 
where and when (with growing pressure on land) land-~xtensive agriculture ceases 
to be feasible. and intensification becomes the only way to sustain and increase 
output per head. The state may be able to assist small farmers finance 
intensification by institutional reform such as recognising the existing farmers as 
the individual owners of the land they cultivate, which should assist them to obtain 
cheaper credit (especially by giving them access to formal sector lenders) 
(Harrison 1990). Indeed, by the mid-1960s extensive exercises in the registration 
of individual title to land had been carried out in Cote d 'Ivoire and Kenya, though 
initial experience in the latter indicates that this was not sufficient to improve the 
flow of formal sector credit to agriculture (Migot-Adholla and others 1991: 165-6). 
It should be noted that. contrary to the usual assumption derived from Western 
experience. free market competition between fariners in tropical Africa will not 
necessarily lead to a concentration of land ownership. IS 
Thus governments have made some notable contributions to post-colonial 
economic development, and more will be needed in future: investment in health 
and education. provision of physical infrastructure, support for the development 
of new areas of comparative advantage. Potentially the most useful of all may be 
the role of impersonal referee, both in the traditional market arenas and in 
conserving the environment (whether through physical controls or by imposing 
taxes and extending private property rights with the aim of using the price 
mechanism to "make the polluters pay"). So in some respects more government 
is needed. not less. This requires reve nue: the historic weakness of state-builders 
in tropical Africa . The final section considers the political dimension of revenue· 
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raising, and whether it will be possible for governments to persuade citizens to 
part with the income needed for effective government , and whether citizens can 
find ways to ensure that their money is used in the public interest rather than in 
the scale-biased ways that have been so damaging to date. 
The record and the prospects ror democratic control, assertion or smallholders' 
interests, and ror strengthening the state 
If the problem of scale bias, and the economic damage it does, results from a lack 
of control by the majority over their governments, the cure must lie in the 
achievement of democracy. There is the further consideration that, even with 
revenue from export agriculture and in some cases minerals, governments in 
tropical Africa are still too poor to perform to the full two ideal roles of 
government in economic development: investing heavily in physical infrastructure 
and the quality of the labour force, and paying its employees enough to be able 
realistically to require them to implement its function of being an honest, 
impersonal referee of the market game. Sustainable growth in public revenue 
must largely await growth in the economy, but there is also a political ~onstraint 
on revenue-raising which may be alleviated by an extension of democratic 
accountability. If the people were less cynical about the uses to which public 
revenues were put, it is possible that they would be more willing to accept (in the 
long run) an increase in the share of government in GNP. 
Post-colonial tropical Africa has very little experience in effective democratic 
control of governments. It can certainly be observed that military interventions 
(coups and attempted coups) have been strongly associated with poor economic 
performance (McGowan and Johnson 1984). Among the most populous countries, 
the three which have enjoyed relative economic success without oil (Cote d'lvoire, 
Kenya, and pre-oil Cameroon) all avoided coups, and had very few coup attempts. 
But this may mean merely that political stability is both a product of and a 
reinforcement to economic success, for the most successful economies of the 
1960s and 1970s were presided over by essentially one-party governments (the 
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three above. plus Malawi: the only economica lly-successful country with a 
relatively open political system was Botswana. whose population numbers less than 
a million). However, ne ither formal political stability nor one-party civilian rule 
has guaranteed economic success, as Tanzania and Zambia demonstrate. 
As Bates has noted , one political condition contributing to economic success 
has been where cash-crop fanners have been an influential lobby within the ruling 
coalition, as in Cote d'lvoire and in Kenya during the Kenyatta era (to 1978). In 
both countries the political influence of export agriculturists helped to save the 
sector from the imposition of punitive taxation, implicit and overt, as happened 
in most of the other countries. The question this begs, of what determined the 
political strength of this economic interest, must be left to another paper. It 
should be noted that in both cases the cash-crop lobby included a minority of 
substantial landowners. who were an important source of its power (Bates 1981 , 
1989) but whom in other contexts might be in conflict with the smallholders, thus 
weakening the political expression of those interests that they share. 
Even with the current wave of liberal reform there are strong reasons to doubt 
that effective democratic control of government is possible in these primarily 
agricultural, smallholder-based economies. First, Bates argues that a multitude of 
small producers are structurally weaker in asserting their political interests than 
a small number of big players (Bates 1981). This helps to explain why it has been 
rare for smallholders to act together to oppose heavy taxation (explicit and 
implicit). Second. one might ask how it is possible to prevent the holders of 
government office from exploiting the potential for administratively-created "rents" 
(cf. Krueger 1974). Such behaviour not only creates artificial transactions costs 
which may burden the whole economy. but is liable to be turned to advantage by 
the most powerful sectional interests. Third, in such a context small producers are 
likely to see as their best chance of gaining access to a share of government 
bounty (subsidised farm inputs. roads, clinics. jobs for family members) to align 
themselves behind a powerful patron, along with a large section of the other small 
producers in the state. This is the basic economic rationale for "tribalism", which 
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is no atavism but, on the contrary, a highly up-to-date political vehicle. In sum, it 
may seem that unchecked economic individualism will most likely lead to a sub-
optimal impasse: while an efficient market system requires an impersonal. 
impartial referee, the logic of free-riding and rent-seeking prevents its 
achievement, resulting in what for most people is a misallocation of economic 
resources (cf. Toye 1987: 124). 
But there are also reasons for hope. Shared interest may surely be the basis 
for coalitions to pursue genuinely national rather than necessarily sectional aims. 
Also, there is an (admittedly fragmentary) tradition of direct, organised popular 
resistance to arbitrary government in tropical Africa (Kunze 1991), and peasants 
and small capitalists have been known to unite and mount effective opposition to 
monopsonists' attempts to impose unfavourable producer prices on them (O'Brien 
1979, Austin 1988). And after all, cash-cropping peasants as well as estate-owners 
were powerful in the agrarian politics of the Kenyatta regime (Leys 1971; Bates 
1989: 86-91). Finally, individual economic rationality can co-exist with enlightened 
self-interest and the demand for and acceptance of a degree of civic responsibility 
in relation to (in a more than formal sense) the nation. It may not be too fanciful 
to see in the present agitations for political liberalisation in Africa the 
strengthening of the political culture of citizenship as opposed to that of 
subjecthood. If so, there is a chance that in future governments will have a greater 
tendency than in the past to avoid interventions which favour the rich and 
powerful while hindering the fulfilment of the economic potential of the 
population as a whole. On the same speculative ground it may be that populations 
will be more willing to accept that if national income per head rises substantially, 
the share allocated to government expenditure should also rise, to facilitate the 
fulfilment of government's roles in economic development. 
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NOTES 
I. This is a much shorter and significantly revised version of a background paper 
for the World Bank's World Development Report 1991. J would like to thank 
Roberto Zarga of the World Bank for inviting the original paper. and Jan 
Phimister of the Department of Economic History, University of Cape Town, for 
valuable cOlllments. Because of limited space only a minimum of references are 
given. Readers wanting further references on specific points are asked to write to 
the author. Below. "African" refers to tropical Africa. 
2. There has always been a strong tendency for trends in thought about African 
d8velopment to renect trends in Western self-confidence as well as changes in 
Africa itself (O'Brien 1972. Hopkins 1986: 1474-5). 
3. Preliminary results from the 1992 census shows this figure to be considerably 
exaggerated. However, the implications of the downward revision for current 
estimates of national product (in view of its subsistence component), national 
product per head and other indicators has yet to be assessed in print for 1991 . let 
alone for earlier years. As it happens, the argument of the paper does not hinge 
upon whether the Nigerian population is over 110 million or less than 90 million. 
Accordingly, J have used the old data in this table and below. 
4. Here, "peasants" farm at least part-time on land they own or control. rely 
primarily on the farmowner's own and family labour, produce food for family 
consumption and (note) also sell produce or labour-time. The "family" may be 
conjugal or otherwise. 
5. The landmark synthesis was Hopkins 1973. For refinements, see Berry 1976, 
Hopkins 1978, Tosh 1978. Mosley 1983, ch. 3. Perhaps the most innuential 
restatement of a variant of the traditional view is Hyden 1980, which argues that 
African peasants maintain an "economy of affection" up to the present. 
6. This contrasts with the conventional view that the cocoa "take-off' was a "vent" 
for "surplus productive capacity" (Myint 1964 and others). 
7. For a survey of ecological, demographic and cultural explanations of the 
"backwardness" of precolonial technology, s~e Austen and Headrick 1983. 
8. Contrary to the stimulating argument of Wilks (1966, 1975), for Asante. See 
Arhin (1986) and Yarak (1990). 
9. Both kingdoms were relatively densely populated by the prevailing standards 
in tropical Africa, and both took advantage of this in extracting surplus from their 
subjects. The Jmerina kingdom applied large-scale coercion to mobilise labour for 
irrigated rice-growing. transport and manufacturing. by means of slavery and 
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tribute labour (Berg 1981, Campbell 1988). In Abysinnia the emperors had long 
succeeded in extracting tribute from all cultivators, in what might in a broad sense 
be called a feudal mode (Crummey 1980). 
10. C. C. Wrigley in a review in African Economic History 2 (1976), p. 45. 
11. This should mean above their respective free market equilibrium levels. but 
for practical purposes of domestic policy it means their world market equilibrium 
levels. Significant and sustained deviation of the official value of a currency from 
its world market equilibrium level leads to a parallel market in the national 
currency. The world market equilibrium level is influenced by imperfections in the 
markets for different currencies (such as when the value of a country's currency 
is undermined by a cartel raising the cost of an essential import, or when 
"dumping" by a competitor reduces the price of its exports). In principle, in such 
a context the implicit export tax entailed in "over-valuation" might merely offset 
the windfall gain in terms of domestic purchasing power which accrues to 
exporters when the national currency is bid down by overseas cartels. But it is not 
credible that the vast discrepancies that existed in this period between the official 
and parallel market exchange rates of most of the currencies concerned can be 
explained away thus. 
12. Estimates of domestic purchasing power (ICP) give rather higher figures for 
average gross product per head of most African countries compared to the USA 
than do the usual GNP numbers. For example, in 1985 Ethiopian average gross 
product per head was only 0.7% of the U.S. level when measured by GNP (Atlas 
method), whereas it was 2.0% in terms of ICP. The same order of difference 
applied to the substantially less poor Cameroon, whose figures were 4.9% and 
9.8% respectively (World Bank 1987). Moreover, even the ICP measure does not 
correct one major weakness of GNP as a measure of African output. namely that 
it seems to take insufficient account of subsistence production. 
13. Net barter terms of trade: ratio of indicies of unit prices of exports and 
imports. Income terms of trade: the same, multiplied by index of the volume of 
exports. 
14. Cameroon began producing oil in 1978. Output peaked in 1985 and 1986, and 
the country temporarily enj9yed higher oil earnings per head than Nigeria. 
15. The matters outlined in this paragraph are hard to document systematically, 
but are well known from the everyday experience of millions. My primary source 
is personal observation in the late 1970s and 1980s in nineteen SSA countries, 
several of them with extensive control regimes. 
16. In th is context, the African franc (CFNAFA) was also over-valued, in that its 
exchange rate was (generally, and especially in recent years) boosted by its tie to 
the French franc. However, this was on a smaller order of magnitude than the 
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over-valuation of. for example. the Tanzanaian shilling and the Ghanaian cedi in 
the 1970s and early 1980s. 
17. Evidence on changes in competitiveness is difficult to obtain, but for Ivorian 
industry there is some quantitative evidence of improvement (i.e. of declining unit 
domestic resource costs of earning or saving foreign exchange). See Riddell 1990: 
169-71. 
18. Similarly, in East Asia agricultural productivity increased over several centuries 
without a trend towards larger units of cultivation (Bray 1986): albeit for different 
reasons than (arguably) apply in tropical Africa. Leys noted that in Kenya "the 
effect of registration of titles may well have been to make the really small land-
holder proof against pressure to sell his land from those able to crush him with 
the costs of litigation, as used to be common in the traditional courts before the 
creation of registered titles" (Leys 1971: 319). See, further, Feder and Noronha 
1987: \56-57. 
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